Prioritizing Innovative Governance Partnerships
*This essay is one of six included in the August 3-4, 2011 eSeminar, Revisiting Strategies for Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Assessing the Findings of the 2011 World Development Report
Innovative Governance Partnerships, Not Institution Building Are the Key to Helping Countries out of Conflict
Wars are fought over political issues, not institutional ones. The 2011 World Development Report’s focus on institution-building misses the point in conflict countries by offering technical solutions to primarily political problems. The report supports the World Bank’s central modus operandi – assisting States at a technical level. Its central message that legitimate government institutions need to be strengthened, in order to prevent conflict, rests on the assumption that the State in question is at least moving toward becoming a Weberian bureaucracy, and its institutions are beginning to protect the country’s citizenry. This was an appropriate assumption for the Bank to make in the post-World War II environment in which it was founded, when the United States and its allies provided strong political backing at the highest levels for the reconstruction of Europe and the linking of its citizenry to the State through democratic government.In many conflict-prone countries today, the situation differs starkly. From Sudan to Cambodia to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the State has become a vehicle for private enrichment and predation against its population, instead of protecting its people against threats. In such cases, government officials and military officers use the State for their own personal benefit, with few to no checks and balances in place to ensure they would be prosecuted for theft of State resources or war crimes against their own populations. In eastern Congo, for example, Bosco Ntaganda, wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes including massacring 800 people at a time and in control of a large illicit minerals smuggling operation, is deputy commander of a major internationally-backed government military operation. Ntaganda and similar army and police officers have senior backers within the State, and human rights groups within Congo cite that the personal predation has worsened since Congo’s last election.
In such cases, straightforward support to the government – “strengthening legitimate institutions to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs” – is the wrong solution. The individuals in control of these shell agencies severely manipulate the institutions for their own ends, misallocating donor funds and further strengthening their power vis-à-vis groups or leaders that threaten them – freqently popular movements, human rights NGOs, or democratic leaders. This has occurred for years in the fragile, post-war state of Cambodia. Donors continue to endorse the Hun Sen regime’s proposals and increase aid despite the government’s lack of follow-through on prosecuting corrupt officials, for example those involved in a multi-million dollar illegal logging business. In these and similar situations, donor agencies frequently gloss over accountability mechanisms, focusing instead on a disbursement-only approach to get more aid out to developing countries and meet donor targets. This approach only exacerbates conflict and corruption.
Real-world solutions exist for such situtations but require innovation and senior political muscle. Two examples that can have an impact on the calculations of greed-driven leaders within fractured states are mixed international-local courts that prosecute corruption and/or war crimes cases or joint certification systems for resources that have independent monitoring. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, which involved both local and international judges, is one successful instance in which the individuals most responsible for war and economic crimes were brought to justice. A similar initiative is being piloted in the DRC today but on a lower level. On the natural resources side, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has helped governance reform in Nigeria, Azerbaijan, and provided a window for reform in Equatorial Guinea.
Such initiatives require not only careful crafting so that a nation’s sovereignty is not infringed upon but also senior political backing and regular attention from politically relevant donor countries, so that the courts do not turn into witchhunt trials for local politicians trying to snuff out their enemies. The appointment of senior-level special envoys from donors are one way of accomplishing this, for instance the late Richard Holbrooke for Afghanistan/Pakistan or Special Court prosecutor David Crane, who had the ear of the Bush administration on West Africa. Similarly, the Obama administration should today appoint a high-level envoy to the Great Lakes of Africa region, in order to spur the mixed courts and conflict minerals certification initiatives.
The WDR gives several constructive recommendations, including increasing donor flexibility and offering better approaches in delivering post-conflict aid to deliver quicker results for war-weary populations. But if the Bank and its board member donor countries do not learn the lessons of accountability and begin to focus on mixed governance partnerships, we will continue to pour money into war-torn countries and even worsen the problems we came to solve.
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Comment #1
Welcome to this session. I will use my prerogative as moderator to ask Sasha Lezhnev the first question. You are right in identifying the political challenges facing fragile states. How would you propose we overcome the associated sovereignty issues? What practical role could institutions like the World Bank play in this regard?
Comment #2
Good question, Raymond. Sovereignty is still the paramount driver in international relations today, but it comes with a responsibility - for example, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). When protection of a country's civilians is at major risk, for example in the DRC, then the Bank and other international actors can and should facilitate mixed transitional governance partnerships. These should come with the aim to improve governance, improve the protection of civilians, and prevent the high-level corruption frequently associated with natural resources. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is one example of this where the Bank is active; the Sierra Leone Special Court is another, where the U.S. and the UN Security Council were more active with the Government of Sierra Leone. The governments in both cases willingly partnered on these initiatives, even though they infringed on strict interpretations of sovereignty. We are moving into a new global era, albeit slowly, and need governance partnerships that mirror this reality.
Comment #3
We all understand that a functioning state is a prerequisite for security and short-term development. In the long-term, however, participation from all segments of the population is necessary to foster sustained economic growth. This participation is also fundamental for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the achievement of long-term political stability. Governance refers precisely to the set of formal and informal, governmental and civil structures that define the authority and power of the state and the participation of all citizens in the management of a country’s affairs.
Search for Common Ground has worked in a number of post conflict settings on promoting good governance. The approach we have taken focuses on participatory democracy – i.e. a system where all segments of society are given political representation and a voice through which they can influence the decision-making process. As a member of civil society, SFCG has worked to establish platforms for diverse social groups to have access to decision-making processes in Angola, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Indonesia, Liberia and Sierra Leone—thus contributing to the consolidation of good governance and participatory democracy in each of those countries. Our work has tended to work on the accountability and responsiveness dimensions of the CAR governance framework.
Working in transitional and post-conflict countries has shown that establishing democratic institutions does not necessarily mean that democratic values are being accepted. During electoral processes, for instance, political candidates and parties who are representing and protecting competing interests have the tendency to polarize societies and further divide communities. As a consequence, civil society needs to be strong enough to prevent the state, which after conflict is normally fragile and vulnerable to manipulation, from implementing exclusionary or autocratic policies. Civil society also needs to initiate a national conversation, both within itself as well as with the state, on how the common good and public interest can be pursued within the democratic framework. Such discussions will inevitably lead to differences on ideas, priorities, strategies and allocation of resources. Specifically, countries working towards participatory democracy often face the following challenges:
§ Defining a new political order: In most post-conflict and transitional countries, elections are organized at the same time as governing structures, such as constitutions and legislative bodies, are supposed to be developed. How should power be administered and shared? In general, governments of inclusion are the favored solution, but they are often not representative of the population, nor are they particularly transparent.
§ Reconciliation: After violent conflict, relationships at different levels of society are marked by distrust, fear, anger and prejudice. This undermines social capital of solidarity and cooperation. Reconciliation and democracy are intertwined in that participatory democracy can address and change negative relationships, promoting instead values of tolerance and inclusiveness.
§ Decentralization: Most countries emerging from violent conflict face a dilemma between concentrating power in the central state and deferring responsibilities to local authorities. Both options carry risks and opportunities: whereas decentralization may foster participation and inclusiveness, in fact, it may also spread corruption.
§ Transparency: Corruption and patronage seriously undermine the ability of leaders to be accountable and transparent in their actions and handling of public funds and trust. They also occur within complex and ingrained structures linked to both individuals and groups. Confronting these structures requires improving state institutions, as well as changing the social attitudes and cultural norms that allow it.
§ Managing expectations: When a new government comes to power, expectations among the population usually run high. And when these expectations appear not to be met – as when the government and its partners are not able to communicate effectively to the population on development priorities, progress made and challenges faced – people get frustrated and begin to feed on rumor, which can cause chaos.
§ Youth Engagement: In transitional and volatile countries, young people usually constitute the largest demographic group within the population. As such, they play a major role in democratic processes and the promotion of good governance. Active youth participation is an important component in all post-conflict situations.
One aspect of participatory democracy is in establishing systems and processes for managing differences without resorting to violence. This is the angle that Search for Common Ground takes in much of our work. SFCG implements a collaborative approach, working closely with relevant authorities and agencies, while at the same time relying on its own values and tools. Interventions in this area are focused on the following broad objectives and associated activities:
Provide citizens with timely, credible and relevant information on governance and democratic processes to create opportunities for their participation.
§ Conducting a media sector mapping to assess how citizens are assessing and utilizing information as well as the criteria or standard they use in developing confidence in public information. (SFCG-Sierra Leone, media sector mapping)
§ Disseminating messages using different media formats, street theatre and town hall meetings. (Ex: SFCG-DRC)
§ Training the general population in rumor management so that they are better able to assess a rumor’s credibility. (Ex: SFCG-Burundi, Studio Ijambo training)
§ Translating policy documents in simple language and distributing them to community radio stations to increase understanding among the population. (SFCG-DRC)
Create platforms for sustained engagement and dialogue between elected officials and their constituents to promote accountability in terms of fulfilling campaign promises.
§ Organizing town hall meetings between constituents and elected officials on governance and democracy issues. Be sensitive to who is attending: Minority groups, youth, women, opposition parties, etc. (Ex: SFCG-Liberia)
§ Turning the process and outcomes of these meetings into media products to be broadcast to a wider listening audience.
§ Facilitating dialogue between traditional and elected leaders to increase cooperation and develop strategies for intervening on post-conflict issues. (Ex: SFCG-Angola, Sobas; SFCG-Burundi, Bashingantahe)
Create the space for civil society to consolidate their efforts and redefine their role in the governance and democracy process.
§ Conducting a capacity assessment of civil society organizations and recommend interventions to improve their capacity to be able to respond to the governance and democracy needs of the country. (Ex: SFCG-Sierra Leone, civil society assessment report; SFCG-Angola)
§ Organizing round-tables among diverse civil society groups such as human rights, peacebuilding, environmental, and development agencies to engage on and discuss strategies to promote the principles of democracy and good governance in a non-polarized manner. (Ex: SFCG-Sierra Leone; SFCG-Liberia)
Strengthen the capacity of local radio stations so that they continue to serve as a channel of communication for development and democracy.
§ Providing on-going technical support and training to radio stations for improved sound quality and cost effective equipment using appropriate technology. (Ex: SFCG-Sierra Leone; SFCG-Liberia: SFCG-Burundi)
§ Working with radio stations to improve their managerial and marketing skills to enable them to effectively manage the stations. (Ex: SFCG-Liberia, supporting community radio stations)
Increase accountability and transparency by confronting corruption in a way that does not fuel scandal and conflict but rather encourages dialogue and the search for lasting solutions.
§ Using radio drama soap opera to highlight some of the cultural norms and values that give rise to corruption. (Ex: SFCG-Sierra Leone, Atunda Ayenda: SFCG-DRC, Mopila)
§ Using radio drama to portray positive characters to educate society about the benefits communities stand to gain when their leaders are not corrupt as a way of modeling new attitudes and behaviors. (Ex: SFCG-Liberia, Today is not tomorrow in Liberia)
Strengthen the capacity of young people to seize opportunities for their effective participation in the democratic and governance process.
§ Training young people in leadership, communication and problem-solving skills to allow them to better participate in governance processes. (Ex: SFCG-Sierra Leone, Bicycle Riders; SFCG-Angola, workshops and outreach to youth in gangs)
§ Producing radio programs to mainstream and highlight issues faced by young people in the governance process as well as their rights and corresponding roles and responsibilities. (Ex: SFCG-Liberia, Young Citizens; SFCG-Angola, Baza Madie)
§ Creating school parliaments to acquaint young people (and in particular young girls) with democratic principles, institutions and processes by role-playing. (Ex: SFCG-Burundi, Women in Governance project)
Increase access of marginalized groups to decision-making and the democratic process.
§ Organizing consultative meetings with communities, inviting women and men to discuss the issues and obstacles limiting their access to the decision-making process. (Ex: SFCG-Sierra Leone)
§ Organizing forums with civil society organizations, media and government on pressing issues. (Ex: SFCG-Angola, Roundtable Meetings on the media legislation)
§ Training women and youth to advocate for their interests before decision-makers at national, provincial and local levels and helping them organize advocacy networks. (Ex: SFCG-Burundi, Women in Governance project)
§ Producing radio programs to inform women and promote their leadership. (Ex: SFCG-Burundi, Women in Governance project)
SFCG’s work on Good Governance in post-conflict and transitional countries has yielded many positive results. SFCG’s worldwide programs have successfully managed to:
§ Promote concepts and values of good governance and participatory democracy through media programming and trainings targeted to journalists, media professionals and communities;
§ Create platforms for marginalized groups – such as women, youth and refugees and IDPs – to discuss important political themes and decisions;
§ Increase the capacity of individuals and communities alike to mediate differences and resolve conflicts through non-violent means, by relying on trainings, participatory theatre and media programming;
§ Foster accountability and transparency in the relations between elected officials and the general public;
§ Divulgate information about progress on key development and security issues, sensitizing the general public to the efforts of governments and international standards for human rights and political participation, thus also managing their expectations.
Question: What do you see as the gaps currently in work undertaken by NGOs in promoting good governance and what priorities do you think they should pursue in their work?
Comment #4
Good post, Nick. NGOs like Search have been doing some of the most pioneering work on shared governance. National reconciliation processes, local dialogues to raise controversial issues either at local fora or in the media -- it is critical in both raising awareness of taboo issues that need to be discussed and in challenging a State-centric monopoly of political space.
That kind of work needs to be supported by senior political work, however, and is where powerful actors need to be more helpful - whether senior U.S. diplomats, multi-national corporations, or multilateral institutions such as the Bank. NGOs can be innovative but can also get shut down by governments, as we have seen with Human Rights Watch in Rwanda, for example. If corporations, the State Department, or multilateral aid agencies ignore these concerns, then the innovative governance partnerships will have little chance at succeeding.
Comment #5
Hi Sasha! I would like to share my own personal views on the matter. As a student of political science, international studies, and international political economy at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines, I agree that there is a need to prioritize innovative governance partnerships. But it would do well to make the partnership a tripartite partnership - between the donor agency, the national government, and the people's organization with the assistance of a non-government organization - rather than merely a bilateral partnership between the donor agency and the national government. In the Philippines as in most developing countries, the failure to conduct social preparation and build the capacities of the post-conflict communities failed to create significant impact for the implementation of various donor-driven and government-provided socioeconomic development programs. At the same time, it has failed to prepare the communities to actively participate in ensuring peace and security in their respective areas. This was confounded by problems of graft and corruption, state failures and breakdowns, patronage politics, and weak institutional capacities of some autonomous regional governments to ensure the conduct of good governance. To address these problems, there is a need to recognize the role of post-conflict communities in peacebuilding and in prioritizing innovative governance partnerships. Public-private partnerships should not only involve the privatization of services that are traditionally provided by national governments but partnerships should also be made between post-conflict communities and their governments, from the national to the local level. It is only by involving the post-conflict communities in the process of governance can real change be achieved.
Comment #6
I will agree that "wars are fought over political issues and not institutional ones," generally speaking. However, it is not as simple as the case of Mindanao in Southern Philippines where Muslim secessionist rebels clamour self-determination in their so-called Bangsamoro homeland. The cry for self-determination is rooted on a legal historical antecedent--the Treaty of Paris. Hence, the present political geography was defined in the context of a legal document between two colonial powers. Because the Moros or Muslim Filipinos in Southern Philippines were never colonized, the Spanish empire cannot cede their homeland to the United States. Thus, local historians argue that the Bangsamoro territory was summarily annexed to the Philippine state by virtue of the regalian doctrine expressed by all four Constitutions of the Republic--1899, 1935, 1973, and 1987 Philippine Constitutions. The Local Government Code of 1991 attempted to remedy the existing cultural fragmentation and harmonize indigenous governance with national interests. But in a feudal society, democratic systems are under strain because modern legal systems was forced upon a people that has yet to emerge from cultural stupor. As a result, the decentralized set-up failed to strengthen regional adaptive capacities which operates within a centrist bureaucracy. The struggle for self-governance has become "institutional" to a huge extent. On the other hand, the problem is also "political" in nature because social structures are comprised of personalities. We know that the harmony of any society is characterized by the quality of relationships. The forging of a final peace agreement between the government and the rebels, for example, can be achieved by sound political maneuvering or good-faith negotiations. Clearly, that is a political act. But the sustainability of a peace accord will have to be bouyed by the dexterity of existing institutions. Otherwise, the peace deal will crumble and conflict will escalate. In this light, conflict must be approached by a double-action of institutional reform and political will. However, without a compelling national narrative, any effort to resolve conflict could be temporary.
Comment #7
I also agree that the success of peace and conflict strategies entails the flexing of political muscle.
I strongly recommend that innovations in governance partnerships should contain the following:
(1) transparency and accountability mechanism
(2) community enterprise development
(3) incentivizing good governance practices of local area managers
(4) electoral reform
(5) security sector reform (to encompass justice reform)
Comment #8
"Increase accountability and transparency by confronting corruption in a way that does not fuel scandal and conflict but rather encourages dialogue and the search for lasting solutions"
I agree. While I am not familiar with the experiences of other countries, in the Philippines, the current administration strongly recommends that national line agencies and local government units engage with civil society organizations in promoting good governance. The CSOs may be tapped as independent or third-party monitors and they will (formally) partner with the government in ensuring the transparent and accountable delivery of services and implementation of projects. But as what was said, the partnership should not cause conflict and put either party in a bind. The monitoring does not use the usual anti-corruption or fault-finding approach and would encourage collaboration instead. Since government is working to address so many issues (or stress factors, as mentioned in the WDR), it would be good the CSOs can help and work with government identify gaps in the course of a program or project's implementation.
Comment #9
Interesting discussion and very helpful comments. A couple of questions for Sasha Lezhnev (and any other takers): first, if you had to re-draft a document like the 2011 WDR what specifically would you add/subtract to address the issues you raise; second, what advice would you give practitioners/officials seeking to implement your proposals in regions affected by violent conflict?
Comment #10
It is great to hear these comments, building on the general framework of innovative governance partnerships. I know less about the Philippines case, but one example of how an NGO or CSO can act as a watchdog through a governance partnership is how Global Witness partnered with the Cambodian goverment to act as a monitor to ensure the lessening of the illicit timber trade. This monitoring system was eventually broken up because of lack of political will on the part of the Cambodian government, and therefore donors need to press harder to enable these type of mixed governance systems to work in the future. The Specialized Mixed Court in the DRC Congo is one present-day such example of a system that needs such high-level donor support, and where CSOs can be monitors and watchdogs to the system.