United States Institute of Peace

International Network for Economics and Conflict

Could ‘Smart Power’ Curb Somali Piracy?

Somali piracy remains worrisome, in spite of recent attempts to address a growing threat.  This phenomenon affects global geo-strategic interests, as well as the lives and livelihoods of citizens across the world.  Countries in Europe, Asia and America have become actively involved in seeking to deter and defeat the pirates militarily, including some not usually associated with military intervention like Denmark and Germany, which made the unanticipated transition from escort duties to military intervention in 2005.  Ironically, piracy has deepened and widened since the deployment of naval forces from over a dozen countries to the Gulf of Aden in recent years.  This is partly because Somali piracy presents a uniquely complex security challenge and partly because threat perception, analysis and response mechanisms in most countries are still rooted in a Westphalia paradigm.  The complexity is two-fold: first, because of the role of transnational, non-state actors; second, because of the mutually-reinforcing nexus involving greed and grievance at play in this conflict.  Also, because foreign policy is still very state-centric policymakers default to the use of traditional military-led solutions when faced with a security threat.  The disproportionate amount of resources devoted to military strategies reflects this continued bias.  For example, development resources dedicated to the Horn of Africa by the European Union are a small fraction of the estimated $150 million spent each year by the European Union’s Operation ATALANTA in Somalia since its inception in December 2008.

Military-led solutions to piracy can be ineffective and counterproductive.  They are not ineffective because the navies are inept.  The problem is that naval power only addresses the symptoms of the malaise (i.e. growing maritime crime) and not the root causes (including political problems on the land, impunity and limited economic opportunities for young Somalis).  This is why after years of robust military engagement and unprecedented naval collaboration, Somali piracy persists at unacceptable levels.  Militarized solutions to what is essentially a governance issue could also be counterproductive.  Unintended consequences could include the increasing lethality and rising ransom demands, as pirates factor increased risk and costs in their calculations.  Also, there are limited incentives to reform when military force fails to effectively deter the ‘spoilers’ and non-military assistance does little to promote the ‘enablers’ in society.  International stakeholders could play a positive role, but lasting success will only be guaranteed if interventions are based on ‘smart power,’ which entails a judicious balance of defense, diplomacy and development. 

The mosaic of political, ethnic, socio-economic and ideological challenges in Somalia presents a daunting, but not insurmountable conundrum.  Three broad lessons could be drawn from recent experience.  First, more attention should be devoted to conducting targeted conflict analyses that would identify key relationships among individuals and institutions (inside and outside Somalia).  Thus, the focus of foreign interventions would be to dismantle illicit relationships, while focusing on strengthening potentially productive linkages using both diplomacy and development assistance.  Second, the Somali situation must be treated as a complex emergency, with sustained efforts to provide improved security and economic opportunity for all.  Military-led interventions are perceived (and treated) as having everything to do with foreign interests and little to do with progress and prosperity for Somalia’s citizens.  This must change.  Third, levels of information-sharing and coordination for diplomacy and development must mirror recent progress in the naval arena.  Both diplomacy and development efforts are generally disjointed and inadequate.  Working with regional organizations and neighboring states, international stakeholders could employ ‘smart power’ in addressing Somali piracy and demonstrate their commitment to much more than narrow national interests.

Comment #1

The Somali case is a great example of the point I was making in the eSeminar: generalizations are not too helpful because useful interventions are likely to be very country-specific. 

 

As a former Navy officer, it is hard to accept the notion that navies are "inept", but it is very easy to embrace the notion that spending $150 million a year intervening on land could do more to reduce piracy than spending it on naval patrols.

 

A key step is language ability.  I wonder how many of the countries trying to curb Somali piracy have experts who can converse fluently in the Somali language(s).

 

The Somali case also brings to mind a piece I wrote several months ago suggesting that a smart way forward in these cases may to systematically empower regional warlords instead of trying to strengthen the central government.  Systematically meaning favoring the "enlightened" warlords over the abusive ones.

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